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Even within teams of peers, certain individuals have more power than others. Individual members may
have essential skills and experience, networks outside the team, or status within the organization that
give them more power than the average team member (French & Raven, 1959; Hollander, 1958). How
these powerholders use their power may vary from team to team. For example, consider a task force
whose purpose is to solve a problem in the organization’s ability to attract new members. One member
of the team is especially expert in member-engagement practices and root cause analysis, upon which the
team is dependent to complete its task well. This dependency gives her power (Emerson, 1964). She
might use her power solely to influence the team’s task approach in the areas most relevant to her par-
ticular skill. Or she may use her special influence to dominate a range of team functions, from manag-
ing relations with senior leaders, to controlling the conflict-management processes within the group. Or
she might exert no special influence at all, acting as an average team member in all domains. What con-
sequences might her choices have for the effectiveness of this team?
In our research we focused on the issue of how—if at all—individ-
uals use their power in teams, and the impact of their choices on
team effectiveness. Certainly the tactics individuals employ to exert
influence will affect their ability to alter the team’s course. However,
our central question here is not about how influence is enacted, but
rather, to what extent it matters who takes on key team functions–
particular powerful individuals, or the group as a whole. What we
find provides some insight into the tensions powerholders face in
teams and why they might choose not to exercise the power they do
have to influence team functioning.
Why might it matter just who in the team fulfills certain group functions? Following Hackman and
Morris (1975), we expect that team performance effectiveness is a joint function of three performance
processes: (a) the level of effort group members collectively expend carrying out task work, (b) the appro-
priateness to the task of the performance strategies the group uses in its work, and (c) the amount of
knowledge and skill members bring to bear on the team task. Any group that brings high levels of effort
to bear on its work, develops good-quality and well-coordinated performance strategies, and brings broad
knowledge and skill to bear on the work is quite likely to perform well. By the same token, groups that
behave in ways that undermine effort, choose inappropriate strategies, or underuse group knowledge and
skill are likely to perform relatively poorly. 
We argue that individual domination vs. collective participation in managing key team functions may
impact team effectiveness by enhancing or undermining the degree to which teams engage high levels
of effort, make high-quality choices about task strategies and/or deploy the full range of knowledge and
skill in the team. Thus, while we acknowledge that all teams are likely to be better off when basic team
functions are accomplished, we also argue that teams will be most effective when particular functions are
decided upon and performed by the team-as-a-whole, while others are better accomplished by a powerful
individual team member. 
TEAM PROCESS AND PERFORMANCE
Most of the models of how group behavior influences group performance address task functions andex-
ternal and internal relational functions (e.g., Hackman, 1987; Goodman, Ravlin & Schminke, 1987;
Wageman & Mannix, 1998). In the following sections we focus on these three categories of behavioral
“Our central question here 
is not about how influence is 
enacted, but rather, to what 
extent it matters who takes 
on key team functions.”
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functions teams must perform (e.g., task, internal relations, and external relations), and we examine the
relationship between individual power use, this set of functions, and team effectiveness. We limit our dis-
cussion to teams with high task interdependence that must solve complex problems as well as implement
their solutions, and we examine these phenomena in such teams in a field setting.
Task Functions. The effective performance of task functions is the reason-for-being for most organiza-
tional teams. A number of behaviors fall into this category, such as the development of task-appropriate
work strategies, setting team agendas and plans, arriving at decision rules, and making project decisions
(Gladstein, 1984; Levine & Moreland, 1990; Wageman & Mannix, 1998). 
Several theorists have argued that team members should have authority to develop their own strategic
processes to achieve their ultimate goals (cf., Hackman, 1987; Wageman, 1995; Zander, 1979). Of course,
it is possible to formally assign team control over strategic task processes, but also for that control to
emerge in the hands of one powerful team member. Single decision-makers can provide an advantage in
that they can reduce ambiguity for the team, decrease conflict, and speed decision-making (Eisenhardt,
1989). However, the evidence for the superiority of collective strategic decision-making is more com-
pelling (cf., Maier, 1970; Maier & Solem, 1952; Lippitt, 1940; Janis, 1982). For example, recent work on
self-managed teams (Wageman, 2001) has demonstrated the importance of multiple sources of influence
on the design of task strategies. In this study, groups in which the team-as-a-whole determined strategic
changes outperformed those in which the informal team leader did so. Because greater collective knowl-
edge was brought to bear on strategy and individual team members were more committed to imple-
menting that strategy when all members were involved, team performance suffered by contrast when
powerful individuals dominated task strategy. Two benefits thus may result from collective control over
task processes: (1) higher quality strategies based on the full use of the range of experiences, perspectives,
and knowledge of team members, and (2) stronger effort from the team based on a higher level of engage-
ment, responsibility, and understanding (Jehn & Shah, 1997; Barry, 1991). When powerholders elect to
dominate task strategy, therefore, the team is damaged by that choice.
Ironically for powerholders, teams may nevertheless be more satisfied when a powerful individual deter-
mines the strategy than when they are collectively engaged in such decisions. Although the increased
level of engagement, responsibility and authority of team involvement in strategizing heightens motiva-
tion (Hackman & Morris, 1975; Naylor, Pritchard, & Ilgen, 1980), the burdens of building consensus
around task approaches and strategic decisions are non-trivial. Research findings have shown that in
some teams the stress of conflict and the added responsibility of strategic decision-making results in low
satisfaction for team members. Relational conflict in particular is especially likely to reduce satisfaction,
but even constructive task conflict has been shown to decrease satisfaction and increase frustration and
unhappiness, even when it improves outcomes (Jehn, 1995; Ross, 1989). Consequently, we expect that:
Hypothesis 1: Teams in which task strategies and team decisions are determined by the
team-as-a-whole will perform more effectively but be less satisfied than teams in which
they are determined by a single, powerful individual. 
A second task function that contributes to the performance of teams is the evaluation of team assump-
tions and strategies (Allison, 1971; Cosier & Schwenk, 1990; Hoffman, 1979; Janis, 1982; Mason &
Mitroff, 1981). For example, techniques such as dialectical inquiry and devil’s advocacy have been shown
to improve team performance both in the laboratory and in the field (e.g., Schwenk, 1990). One impor-
tant characteristic of these techniques when used experimentally is that these teams are given formal,
structured ways of engaging in team evaluation. In such settings, group members understand that
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skeptical evaluation of the team’s choices is an essential part of the task assignment, and that process is
structured rather than chaotic. In naturally occurring teams, this is not necessarily the case. Evaluation,
if it occurs, is an emergent process. In some cases, it might not occur at all, as teams are contexts in which
the questioning of assumptions or ideas often is resisted (Hoffman, 1979; Janis, 1982). In other cases, if
the group-as-a-whole is involved in questioning itself, the result may be a group that is paralyzed by
uncertainty and indecision (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, a powerful individual who uses his or her
power to take on the role of team critic may facilitate team performance. Restricting this role to one indi-
vidual allows the group to retain its focus on implementing its chosen strategies, while at the same time
incorporating alternative views and perspectives to make them of better quality. 
For the powerholder, the choice to become team critic is not cost-free. While team evaluation is a neces-
sary function for team performance, it also causes frustration and stress among team members (Guzzo,
1982; Jehn, 1995). When one individual plays the role of devil’s advocate, even when that behavior results
in better team performance, that individual can create negative affect, and cause group members to be
less willing to continue working as a team (Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986). When the team-as-a-
whole is engaged in questioning and self-doubt, it can seriously delay decision-making, causing frustra-
tion and uncertainty (Eisenhardt, 1989). By contrast, teams in which no one raises doubts or questions
may become more confident in their position, and as a result, be more satisfied than teams in which deci-
sions and underlying assumptions have been questioned (Janis, 1982; Harvey, 1996). 
Hypothesis 2a: Teams in which a powerful individual critiques team functioning will
perform more effectively than teams in which the group-as-a-whole does so.
Hypothesis 2b: Teams in which a powerful individual critiques team functioning will be
less satisfied than teams in which no one does so.
Internal Relationship Functions. Teams also must find ways to work together without undue tension and
to keep up their collective commitment to the task (O’Reilly & Caldwell, 1985; Hackman, 1987; Shah &
Jehn, 1997). Several recent studies have demonstrated the performance benefits of friendships within
teams (e.g., Valley, Neale & Mannix, 1995). For example, Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams & Neale (1996)
found that teams with friendly relations were more likely to share important task information and out-
perform teams without friendship ties. The broader use of knowledge and skill that comes with friend-
ship may enhance performance of complex tasks. By contrast, when group members are embroiled in
interpersonal friction, they may become distracted from the task,
withdrawing their efforts (Argyris, 1962; Kelley, 1979; Roseman,
Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981). 
But is a team better off if a powerful individual manages internal
relations, or if this function is one in which the entire group par-
ticipates? Some theorists have argued that an individual with spe-
cial influence in the group is especially well-suited to manage
interpersonal conflicts, both because groups tend to avoid con-
fronting relational conflict and need active intervention to do so, and because special skills are need-
ed to do so effectively (Hollander, 1958; Schwarz, 1994). However, members of the team 
collectively are more likely to have knowledge of problematic relationship processes, as well as knowl-
edge of the causes of any existing underlying conflicts than any one individual in the team. Further,
the essential skill involved in managing internal relations effectively does not necessarily reside in a
particularly powerful member, whose special influence may be based on factors unrelated to the abil-
“But is a team better off if a 
powerful individual manages
internal relations, or if this
function is one in which the
entire group participates?”  
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ity to maintain good working relations in the team. The collective, rather than individual, management
of relations may thus be a better use of team member knowledge and skill.
The collective management of intra-group relations also can impact team member satisfaction with the
group. Certainly, a powerful individual team member can have special influence in persuading the team
to confront rather than avoid discussing relationship problems. However, team-wide involvement in actu-
ally solving those problems may heighten team member connection to and identification with the team.
Studies of process intervention—involving the group in examining and improving the quality of working
relationships in the team—have generally shown that members find participating in such activities highly
engaging and fulfilling (Kaplan, 1979; Schein, 1988). Moreover, the greater likelihood of shared values
arising from collective management of internal relations – versus an individual intervening to solve rela-
tional problems—increases group perceptions of smooth functioning and reduces emotional distress
(Bar-Tal, 1989, Schein, 1988). Thus, we predict:
Hypothesis 3: Teams in which internal relations are managed by the group-as-a-whole
will perform more effectively and be more satisfied than teams in which they are man-
aged by a single, powerful individual. 
External Relationship Functions. Evidence for the importance of external activities to team performance
is mounting (Gladstein, 1984; Ancona, 1987; Ancona, 1990). One important external activity involves
managing the perceptions and support of outside authority. This external-relations activity typically
involves presenting team capabilities and needs to authorities in the larger organization in order to 
persuade them that the team deserves and will use effectively additional resources. In addition, teams
often must manage relationships with peer teams, with external clients, and with other individuals with
whom they are interdependent.
As discussed earlier in this paper, persons with high power within the team may have that power for a
variety of reasons, including status in the organizational hierarchy, special competence or expertise, 
or even extraordinary verbal ability. Just as these power sources allow the individual to have special
influence over the actions of team members, they also can enhance the credibility of that individual with
external authorities. Further, they enhance the range of access that the individual has to organizational
members with the authority to provide needed resources to the team. Sharing this function broadly among
multiple group members thus may misalign the talents of group members with key team functions. 
At the same time, exclusive contact between a powerful team member and key external constituencies
might be detrimental to group satisfaction in two ways. First, direct contact with users of the team’s 
product or service is known to be an important source of task-based motivation (Hackman & Oldham,
1980). If team members lose touch with clients or peer groups, they may feel less committed to the
team’s purpose. In addition, interaction with outsiders often is an opportunity to demonstrate knowledge
and skill. Such relationships offer members the opportunity to network and to improve their status in the
organization. When powerful individuals monopolize contact with external clients or authorities, team-
level engagement and satisfaction may be compromised. Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 4: Teams in which external relations are managed by a single powerful indi-
vidual will perform more effectively but be less satisfied than teams in which those
functions are managed by the group-as-a-whole. 
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METHOD 
Research Strategy
We explored these hypotheses in a field study of teams in an international organization that perform
highly complex analytic and coordination tasks. The groups had a lifetime of at least 12 months, and in
some cases up to 3 years. To develop context-specific lists of key team functions in the task, internal-
relations, and external-relations domains, we first drew on qualitative descriptions of the work from
interviewees in multiple teams. We then used systematic surveys to ask all team members in a different
set of teams to identify (1) those individuals within the team who had more power than the average team
member (2) whether each function we described was dominated by a powerful individual or was 
performed by the team as a whole. Finally, we collected independent quantitative measures of team 
performance effectiveness, and survey measures of team member satisfaction. 
Sample and Procedure
Twenty three task-performing teams in a large multi-national financial development organization partic-
ipated in the research. We began by holding structured interviews with members of eight teams that were
not included in the final sample. This preliminary process allowed us to develop measures of specific task
functions relevant to these teams. These interviews addressed three main questions: (1) Who are the espe-
cially powerful individuals in your team? (2) What makes them especially powerful? and (3) What kinds
of decisions does the team have to make in the course of its work? The first two questions allowed us to
develop context-specific language for our survey questions identifying powerful individuals and their
sources of power. The last question allowed us to develop measures of particular team functions
expressed in language that was specific to these teams’ tasks and organization. 
Following our interviews, we selected a sample of 40 teams for participation in our survey. We sampled
teams that performed each of the three generic kinds of tasks accomplished in this organization to
increase the generalizability of our findings, and we chose teams that had few members in common in
order to avoid overburdening any respondent with multiple surveys. We included in the study only those
teams for which we had at least three respondents. Our final sample included 23 teams that varied in size
from four to twelve. All teams in the sample reported to one of two managers; we obtained their assess-
ments of the performance effectiveness of all participating teams.
Research Context
Task. The participating teams were responsible for either (1) the analysis of potential large engineering proj-
ects; (2) planning of approved projects; or (3) the implementation and assessment of approved projects. Teams
performing the analysis task met with potential external clients, assessed the financial and material needs of the
project, explored its political and social impact, and prepared a proposal to the home organization for the fund-
ing of the project. Teams performing the project planning stage were responsible for garnering and organizing
material and human resources for the implementation of the project. Teams performing the implementation
and assessment task managed the on-site building of the projects and assessed the quality of their outcomes.
All three kinds of tasks were multi-month, high-stress tasks demanding a range of team member capabilities,
complex coordination of information, and active debate about the feasibility of different ideas and approaches.
Power. We asked subjects to identify the most powerful and the second most powerful individuals in the team
by their initials. Although individual respondents did not always agree which of the two was more powerful,
a large majority of team members (in 88% of cases all respondents from a team) identified the same two peo-
ple as most powerful. In all cases, one individual was the designated team leader and the other was either a
task expert or the most senior member. These individuals themselves were no less likely to identify themselves
as powerful than were other team members. Thus, powerholders in these teams knew they had power.
89
MEASURES
Team Functions. We operationalized team functions by drawing both on our theoretical outline and on
our exploratory interviews. We attempted to determine, through open-ended questions, observation, and
analysis a full list of specific task, internal-relations and external-relations functions that were performed
by participating teams. The final list of 20 functions appears in Table 1. 
Power Uses. We asked all individual team members to indicate who in the team—a powerful individ-
ual, the team-as-a-whole, or no one—fulfilled each of the 20 different team functions. When respon-
dents indicated that a particular individual dominated a function, they were asked to identify that
individual by initials. We therefore were able to test agreement among team members not only as to
whether the function was fulfilled by the group as a whole vs. a particular individual, but also whether
they agreed about the identity of the individual. In order to ensure valid measures of power use, we
included in the analyses only those cases in which a majority of team members identified the same 
individual. Similarly, when team members disagreed whether an individual or the whole group ful-
filled a particular function, we included only those cases in which a majority of members gave the 
same response.
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T A B L E  1 TEAM FUNCTIONS
TASK FUNCTIONS
1 Determining team meeting agendas
2 Deciding how often to meet as a whole team
3 Defining team objectives
4 Determining team performance standards
5 Determining timing and deadlines of parts of the project
6 Deciding solutions to technical problems
7 Deciding solutions to client-related problems
8 Managing the team budget
9 Determining assignments to team members
10 Deciding who goes on field assignments 
11 Deciding when to go on field assignments
12 Selecting or adding other team members
EVALUATION FUNCTIONS
13 Obtaining performance feedback for the team
14 Establishing norms/acceptable standards of behavior
INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP FUNCTIONS
15 Addressing interpersonal conflicts in the team
16 Coordinating communications among team members
EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIP FUNCTIONS
17 Managing relations with senior management 
18 Managing relations with peers in other parts of the firm
19 Managing relations with the external client
20 Managing relations with external consultants
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Team Task Processes. Team effort was assessed using a four-item Likert-type scale (e.g., “My own feel-
ings are not much affected by the way this team performs,” reverse-scored). Quality of team strategy was
assessed using a two-item Likert-type scale (e.g., “Our team has difficulty developing plans for how we
will proceed with the task”.) Team use of knowledge and skill was measured using a three-item Likert-
type scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (e.g., “This team made good use of all
our talents.”). Cronbach’s alpha was acceptable for all three scales (.92, .76, and .83, respectively).
Intra-class correlations for these scales all were significant, indicating that they could reasonably be
aggregated and treated as team-level measures.
These survey items were intermixed with each other and with the member satisfaction scale, as well as
with several other scales not described in this report, and all scales contained at least one reverse-scored
item to minimize response bias. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for measures are present-
ed in Table 1.
Outcome Measures. Teams’ managers provided ratings of team effectiveness in terms of the degree to
which teams met or exceeded their clients’ needs. These items asked managers to rate the teams’
effectiveness on a 5-point scale (see Appendix A). Member satisfaction with the team was assessed via a
three-item Likert-type survey scale that asked respondents to rate each item on a scale from 1=strongly
disagree to 7=strongly agree (e.g., “I frequently think of leaving this team,” reverse-scored). Cronbach’s
alpha for this scale was .91, and the intraclass correlation was significant. 
RESULTS
Analytic Strategy
All analyses were conducted at the team level. We assessed the effects of power use on team effectiveness
by conducting ANOVAs in which power use (team function fulfilled by a powerful individual, the group,
or no one) served as the independent variable, and performance and member satisfaction as the depend-
ent variables. We conducted separate analyses on each of the team functions because we had no theoret-
ical reason to expect items that represented different task functions to be intercorrelated. For example,
“defining team objectives” certainly could be fulfilled by a powerful individual in a team, while “deciding
who goes on field assignments” (also a task function) might be done by the whole team. Means for 
performance and satisfaction levels as influenced by who ful-
filled each function are presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
Because all our hypotheses specify the impact of power use
on team effort, team strategy and team use of knowledge and
skill, we also conducted a three-stage mediation analysis
process as suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). We first
tested, as described above, the effects of power uses on the
dependent variables, as described above. Second, we assessed
whether our proposed mediators were significant predictors
of the dependent variables. As can be seen in Table 2, all three proposed mediators were significantly
related to team performance, and none of the three processes was significantly related to team member
satisfaction. We therefore conducted mediation analyses only on team performance effects. For the final
stage of the mediation analysis, we used a general linear model in which all three proposed mediators
were included in the analysis for each group function for which there was a significant effect of
power use. 
“Teams in which no individual
dominates agendas are more
engaged in the task and
make better use of member
knowledge and skill.”
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Task Functions and Team Effectiveness
Hypothesis 1 predicted that teams in which task strategies and key team decisions were determined by
the team-as-a-whole would perform more effectively than teams in which they were determined by one
powerful individual. For all three task functions for which there was a significant performance difference
(determining meeting agendas, deciding solutions to technical problems, and deciding solutions to
client-problems), teams in which the group-as-a-whole determined these functions performed signifi-
cantly better than teams in which one individual performed these functions. 
T A B L E  2 MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS
CORRELATIONS
MEAN  (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6
OUTCOMES
1 Performance 3.17 (1.15) --
2 Quality of process 3.73 (1.05) .49* --
3 Satisfaction 3.99 (.60) .44* -.36 --
MEDIATORS
4 Effort 4.14 (.31) .50* .26 .03 --
5 Strategy 3.41 (1.02) .72* .66* .01 .23 --
6 Use of talent 3.96 (.65) .50* .62* -.25 .25 .58* --
T A B L E  3 EFFECTS OF POWER USE ON TEAM PERFORMANCE 
TEAM FUNCTION INDIVIDUAL (n) GROUP (n) NO ONE (n) F p
1 determining team 2.00a (6) 3.59b (17) (0) 12.11 <.05 
meeting agendas
2 deciding solutions to 2.67a (9) 3.50b (14) (0) 3.13 <.05
technical problems
3 deciding solutions to 2.33a (9) 3.71b (14) (0) 11.63 <.05 
client-related problems
4 getting performance 3.50a (16) 3.00b (5) 2.20c (2) 3.19 <.05        
feedback for the team
5 managing relations with 3.50a (12) 3.10b (7) 2.61c (4) 3.14 <.05        
senior management
6 managing relations 3.45a (17) 3.00b (4) 1.00c (2) 6.07 <.05        
with other departments
7 managing relations with 3.15a (15) 4.00b (4) 2.50c (4) 5.79 <.05        
external consultants
Means that do not share a superscript are significantly different according to Tukey’s HSD at p<.05
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We next conducted mediation tests for these effects. For establishing meeting agendas, the effect of
power use on team performance became non-significant when the three proposed mediators were includ-
ed in the analysis (F=1.61, p>.05), whereas effort (F=5.20, p<.05) and use of team knowledge and skill
(F=4.61, p<.05) remained significant. That is, teams in which no individual dominates agendas are more
engaged in the task and make better use of member knowledge and skill.
For deciding solutions to technical problems, the effect of power use on team performance became non-
significant when the proposed mediators were included in the analysis (F=.89, p > .05), whereas quality
of team strategies was significant (F=2.99, p<.05), indicating that quality of team strategy mediates the
effect of power use on performance for this team function. That is, teams in which no individual dictates
solutions to technical problems generate better task strategies. For deciding solutions to client-related
problems, the effect of power use on team performance became non-significant when the proposed medi-
ators were included in the analysis (F=1.12, p > .05), and all three mediators were significant, indicating
that effort (F=3.23, p<.05), quality of strategy (F=3.69, p<.05), and use of knowledge and skill (F=3.11,
p<.05) all mediate the effect of power use on performance for this team function. That is, teams in which
no individual dominates solutions to client problems are more motivated, make better use of team knowl-
edge and skill, and devise better task strategies than teams in which an individual determines how the
team handles its clients.
Hypotheses 1 also predicted that teams in which one powerful individual determines the task strategies
for the group and makes key team decisions would be more satisfied than teams in which task strategies
and key decisions were collectively determined. The hypothesis also was supported. Specifically, team
members were significantly more satisfied when a powerful individual decided how often to meet,
defined team objectives, determined team performance standards, managed the team budget, decided
when to travel to a field site and who would travel, and selected new team members. We note that these
are different task functions than those for which there were significant performance effects, and return
to this issue in our discussion.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that teams in which a powerful individual provided evaluation of the team would
perform more effectively than teams in which the group-as-a-whole did so. Two measures of evaluation
of the team were assessed: providing performance feedback to the team, and enforcing internal norms of
behavior. Teams in which one powerful individual obtained performance feedback for the team per-
formed significantly better than teams in which the group-as-a-whole did so, and these teams were, in
turn, higher performers than teams in which no one did so. Because no significant results were obtained
for enforcing internal norms on performance, Hypothesis 2 received only partial support. Mediation
analysis for providing feedback to the team showed that the effect of power use on team performance
remained significant when the three proposed mediators were included in the analysis but was reduced
in size (F=2.89, p < .05), and quality of team strategies also was significant (F=3.23, p<.05). That is, teams
in which an individual member provides feedback to the team devise better strategies than those in which
the group-as-a-whole are engaged in team evaluation.
Hypothesis 2 also predicted that teams in which either a powerful individual or the team-as-a-whole 
provides evaluation would be less satisfied than teams in which no one did so. This hypothesis was not
supported. Teams in which a powerful individual obtained feedback were significantly more satisfied
than team members in which the group-as-a-whole did so, who were in turn significantly more satisfied
than team members in which no one performed this function. In addition, teams in which a powerful
individual enforced norms of behavior were significantly more satisfied than team members in which the
group-as-a-whole did so, who were in turn significantly more satisfied than team members in which no
one performed this function. 
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T A B L E  4 EFFECTS OF POWER USE ON MEMBER SATISFACTION 
1 defining team 
objectives
2 determining team
performance standards
3 deciding how often 
to meet
4 allocating assignments
to team members
5 deciding when / whether  
to travel to field sites 
6 deciding who travels
to field sites 
7 managing the team        
budget
8 selecting new members
9 obtaining performance 
feedback
10 coordinating comm.
among team members
11 establishing norms
12 managing relations with
senior management
13 managing relations with  
other departments
14 managing relations
with the client
4.13a (13)
4.21a (16)
4.36a (12)
4.20a (9)
4.24a (14)
4.23a (17)
4.23a (14)
4.28a (17)
4.23a (16)
4.29a (9)
4.38a (16)
4.31a (12)
4.21a (17)
4.19a (15)
3.76b (9)     
3.17b (3)     
3.50b (9)     
4.20a (10)    
3.61b (9)
3.33b (6)
3.63b (9)
3.50b (4)     
3.75b (5)     
3.68b (14)
4.17b (4)     
3.85b (7)     
3.65b (4)
3.63b (8)
2.50c (1)
3.00b (4)    
4.00c (2)
3.00b (4)    
(0)    
(0)    
(0)    
2.50c (2)    
3.00c (2)    
(0)    
3.50c (3)
3.31c (4)
2.85c (2)    
(0)  
4.46
14.68
9.05
14.66
7.70
16.49
6.74
59.58
15.37
4.43
2.75
4.57
5.88
5.47
<.05     
<.05     
<.05     
<.05     
<.05 
<.05 
<.05 
<.05     
<.05     
<.05 
<.05     
<.05     
<.05 
<.05 
TEAM FUNCTION INDIVIDUAL (n) GROUP (n) NO ONE (n) F p
Means that do not share a superscript are significantly different according to Tukey’s HSD at p<.05
Relationship Functions and Team Effectiveness
Hypothesis 3 predicted that teams in which the group-as-a-whole managed internal team relationships
would perform more effectively than teams in which a powerful individual did so. We operationalized the
internal team relationship functions as addressing interpersonal conflicts in the team, and coordinating
communications among team members. Neither function had any significant effect on performance.
Hypothesis 3 also predicted that teams in which the group-as-a-whole managed internal team relation-
ships would be more satisfied than teams in which a powerful individual did so. However, teams in which
a powerful individual coordinated communication among team members were significantly more satis-
fied than teams in which the group-as-a-whole was involved in doing so. Because who addressed inter-
personal conflicts had no significant effect on satisfaction Hypothesis 3 was only partially supported. 
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Hypothesis 4 predicted that teams in which a powerful individual managed relations with external con-
stituencies would perform more effectively than teams in which the group-as-a-whole did so. In support
of this hypotheses, groups in which one individual managed relations with senior management and with
other departments performed significantly better than teams in which the group-as-a-whole performed
these functions. However, groups in which a single individual managed relationships with external con-
sultants performed less effectively than groups in which these relationships were managed by the group-
as-a-whole. 
The external-relations functions included managing relations with senior management, with other
departments, and with external consultants. For managing relations with senior management, the effect
of power use on team performance became non-significant when the proposed mediators were included
in the analysis (F=.19, p > .05), whereas effort remained significant (F=3.09, p<.05), indicating that teams
in which a powerful member managed relations with senior management worked harder at their tasks
than teams in which the group-as-a-whole did so. For managing relations with other departments, the
effect of power use on team performance remained significant at about the same level when the proposed
mediators were included in the analysis as without the proposed mediators (F=5.97, p < .05), and none
of the mediators was significant. For managing relations with external consultants, when the three pro-
posed mediators were included in the analysis, the effect of power use on team performance became non-
significant (F=2.02, p>.05), and effort remained significant (F=3.77, p<.05). This suggests that teams in
which a powerful individual managed relations with external consultants were less motivated than teams
in which the group-as-a-whole did so. 
Hypothesis 4 also predicted that teams in which a powerful individual managed relationships with exter-
nal individuals and teams would be less satisfied than teams in which the group-as-a-whole did so. The
opposite effect was found, as teams in which a power individual managed relations with senior manage-
ment, with other departments, and with the client were significantly more satisfied than teams in which
the group-as-a-whole did so. 
In fact, satisfaction with the group was significantly influenced by power use on 14 of 20 items. The trend
for this effect was similar across all significant items, such that members were more satisfied with teams
in which a powerful individual fulfilled each function than teams in which that function was fulfilled by
the group-as-a-whole. 
DISCUSSION
The findings of this study confirm that it does indeed matter to team effectiveness how a powerful team
member uses his or her power. We found that for some task and relationship functions, team effective-
ness is enhanced when a powerful group member determines what the group should do. For other func-
tions, we have shown that a powerful member enacting a particular function on behalf of the group is no
better than if no one in the team did it at all. Our findings provide new insights about how individuals
who share in the leadership of their teams should exercise influence, and the consequences of their choic-
es for the team—and for themselves.
Powerholders can be helpful to their teams by controlling certain team functions. For example, when
powerful members used their special influence to critique the team’s performance strategy or to identify
problems in the team’s approach, performance was enhanced relative to teams in which the group-as-a-
whole or no one fulfilled this function. That the team is better off when anyone engages in this activity
seems straightforward: without doing so, teams may overlook errors and misconceptions in their
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approach. Why is it more useful, though, for a powerful individual to take on this function than for the
team-as-a-whole to engage in it? We hypothesized that two processes might underlie this finding: the
potential for action paralysis in teams that excessively engage in self-evaluation, and the usefulness of a
focused “devil’s advocate” for thoroughness of strategic review. 
Our exploratory analysis of the task processes mediating this effect provides some support for both expla-
nations. We saw that the effort levels of team members, when the team-as-a-whole engaged in team
review, were lower relative to teams that had a powerful individual review the team’s strategic approach.
This finding suggests that some teams may have suffered the kind of disengagement from action that
may occur with a whole-team focus on critique. Similarly, we found that teams in which a powerful indi-
vidual engaged in team evaluation developed higher-quality strategies than teams in which the whole
group did so. This finding may provide some support for the special effectiveness of a single “devil’s advo-
cate” focusing his or her attention on catching potential errors in the team approach (Gruenfeld, 1995;
Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983; Nemeth & Kwan, 1987; Smith, Tindale, & Dugoni, 1993).
We also saw that certain external-relations management
functions were particularly well-performed by powerful
individuals. As expected, when powerful individuals man-
aged relationships with senior management and with
other departments, teams performed better than when
these functions were fulfilled by the group-as-a-whole.
None of our key task process mediators fully accounted for
these effects, though team-level effort partially mediated
these effects in the field sample. That is, having a power-
ful team member manage these external relations led to
members working somewhat harder on the task, but not necessarily making better strategic choices, or
making better use of team member talents. We suspect, given this pattern of findings, that powerful mem-
bers taking on these functions allowed for a more organized and efficient set of interactions with external
constituencies, allowing the rest of members to focus more attention on other aspects of the team’s work.
These findings elaborate the team external-relations literature (Ancona, 1990; Ancona & Caldwell, 1992;
Goodman, Ravlin, & Schminke, 1987) by suggesting that while some functions are indeed essential to
team effectiveness, they are not necessarily team functions and may be enacted by individual members.
Our findings make it clear that the influence of team functioning is a deeply tricky process for powerholders.
They need to choose carefully the domains in which they exercise influence, as evidenced by the negative
effects of power use on certain aspects of performance. It is not in a group’s best interest for powerful mem-
bers to exert special influence broadly and without distinction among different team functions. Nor is it in a
team’s best interest for powerholders to abdicate their special influence and behave as an average team mem-
ber in all domains. We saw that the quality of team performance was undermined when a powerful individ-
ual dominated certain task functions. These findings are, of course, consistent with the most basic reason
teams are created in the first place—that multiple heads are better than one. We also saw, however, that cer-
tain misuses of individual power not only underutilized the talent in the team, but also caused a general reduc-
tion in effort among team members—the more task functions were dominated by powerful individuals, the
less effort displayed by the average team member. The demotivational effect of the dominance of task func-
tions by a powerful member may arise because members feel no need to engage in certain activities when
someone else is doing so. On the other hand, we may have been observing a general tendency to feel less per-
sonally responsible for the outcomes of the team’s work—a sense that when a powerful individual dominates
task functions, the work is no longer “their” work (Hackman & Morris, 1975; Naylor, Pritchard & Ilgen, 1980).
Powerholders thus may build dependency and disengagement in the team even as they exercise influence for
the sake of team performance.
“Powerholders thus may build 
dependency and disengagement 
in the team even as they exercise 
influence for the sake of team 
performance.”
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Our findings about team member satisfaction present a serious challenge for powerholders, because
team performance and team member emotional responses to the group experience can be driven in dif-
ferent directions by the same behaviors from a powerholder. Although sometimes power use under-
mined team performance, members were almost universally more satisfied when a powerful member
dominated team functions—regardless of the negative performance consequences. Because satisfaction
effects were not mediated by anything that we measured, we can only speculate as to why these effects
occurred here. We gain some possible insight into this question by examining certain special character-
istics of the organizational context where this research was conducted. 
Teams in this organization complete highly complex, demanding, and stressful tasks. Members of these
teams also are assigned to multiple teams. In our interviews, numerous members spoke of being nearly
overwhelmed by the demands placed on them. As a consequence, efficiency of team interactions is high-
ly prized in this setting, and efficiency may well be enhanced by an individual dominating many team
functions. It can be enormously comforting to these team members for someone to exercise authority
and remove certain burdens from the remaining team members.
For the thoughtful powerholder wishing to exercise leadership effectively, this tension poses a painful
dilemma: he or she may choose to elicit from the group collective involvement in devising meeting agen-
das and in solving technical problems for the sake of team performance—and encounter increasing
resistance and unpopularity from team members. For powerholders to “shape up” their teams and teach
them the advantages of collective involvement in certain team activities, uncomfortable as it may be for
members, is surely ideal—and surely risky. Powerholders may find themselves, instead, shaped by the
social pressures within their teams into dominating and directing more team activities than is appropri-
ate in the longer term. 
It may be that the social pressures on powerholders to do more on behalf of the team can explain both
the tendency for some powerholders to dominate most aspects of team functioning and the tendency for
some powerholders to abdicate power and exercise no special influence at all. It is easy to see how a
powerful individual might be seduced into dominating many aspects of team functioning by the increas-
ing popularity he or she experiences from a needy group. But experienced powerholders may recognize
this tendency for teams to be come dependent on a leader over time and to offer seductive positive
reinforcement and popular approval to those who are willing to take over team functioning. Abdication
of responsibility is one way that a powerholder can pull the team back into fulfilling necessary functions
and thereby avoid extreme dependency on a single individual. Abdication is not the most thoughtful
choice for a powerholder, however. Indeed, one might instead be explicit about the particular functions,
such as establishing agendas and managing external relations, that one will fulfill and the others for
which one expects the team to take responsibility. But that kind of thoughtfulness is enormously cogni-
tively and emotionally demanding relative to a general choice to fulfill all or fulfill none of a team’s task
and relationship functions. 
In sum, our analysis suggests that autocratic (“dominate everything”) and laissez-faire (“abdicate”) ten-
dencies may be driven as much—if not more—by the behavior of group members as by the characteris-
tics of individual powerholders. For those seeking to develop their capacities to exercise influence
effectively in collective enterprises, the lessons of this research suggest a focus not on developing partic-
ipative or dominating styles of influence. It suggests instead the importance of developing tolerance for
unpopularity, conceptual understanding of the kinds of functions teams must fulfill for their own per-
formance, and the ability to exercise influence on the tasks and contexts of teams to give them the room
to manage their own work and relational processes.
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APPENDIX 
Team Effectiveness Measure
Consider the main customers or clients of the team’s work – the people inside or outside the organization who are most
affected by what the team produces. From their perspective, how satisfactory is the team’s product or service?
From clients’ perspective, the team’s product or service...
____ ...is truly exceptional
____ ...exceeds expectations by a good margin
____ ...is fully acceptable
____ ...falls somewhat below expectations
____ ...is significantly flawed

